Here is a paper that I wrote that elucidates and challenges Locke’s theory of consciousness and personal identity.
Locke’s theory of personal identity rests upon the foundations of consciousness becoming self-reflective (an old concept to philosophy which separates the thinking animal of humanity from beast—Aristotle’s idea that we are separated by our rationality, otherwise, we are not human) and of this consciousness containing some memory of continuity. The moment we become self-aware, we create a personal identity. Locke states that, so long as we can think back to a particular time within our past and remember it, we are the same person. The first problem begins when we cannot remember a particular event.
This absence of continuity implies, for Locke, that we are not the same person in the case where we earnestly cannot remember an event. A naysayer to this theory might immediately recognize the problem of practicality within this type of logic and jump up and say, “If that is the case, then, whatever I may have done while intoxicated or, while in a strange state of mind, I cannot be held accountable for.” Locke would then introduce his secondary response to this problem and that being, “Yes, this might be true, however, there were witnesses that can attest to your body being physically present and thus, even though you have no recollection of what has transpired, you’re still to be held accountable.”
This quick diversion from the main premise of Locke’s argument may appear to save the day, but I assure you, it does not. I have a few problems with this type of reason that tries to save the Lockean view of identity and I also have problems with his initial concept itself—that of the continuity criterion. First, if we take Locke seriously, and I believe that we should, regarding the possibility that one might not be the same person when in a different state of mind than that of “normal” (what is the average for that individual), simply using the external world as a type of verification of action within a given event, even to prove guilt or innocence, meets with two unique problems: 1) We now rely on the memory of others and their personal identities to provide accurate and true “evidence” as to if the intoxicated person did perform “X”; and 2) Even if we accepted the first part as not problematic, since we also have empirical evidence that might support potentially faulty testimony, we still face a greater issue of holding a “stranger” (the personality created by intoxication that is different from the continuity of the original) accountable for the crimes of another.
I believe that this loophole that I am presenting is the ethical problem that we are facing in the USA at this very moment in time. The amount of “mentally ill” or rather, crimes of temporary insanity, seem to fall under this loophole that I am presenting and seems to offer the criminal a means to escape the law—or at least, a means to diffuse the law’s entire wrath. It is an easy way to escape the pendulum as it swings back upon the one who sent it off balance. Another potential example of relying upon the accounts of strangers and/or some type of empirical evidence is in that, while I may have been fully self-aware and my continuity unquestioned in my own mind as to the fact that I did not commit crime “X,” false testimony and planted “evidence” would make the opposite claim. My issue then being, do we chalk this up to another incident of mental discontinuity on my part (that I believe I have been fully aware but in fact, I might have multiple personalities where one is unaware of what the other is doing—namely, committing crime “X”) or take the false accounts and evidence as proof against the innocent; namely, that I am lying (even if this is “out of character”).
Now, against the continuity criterion, I will make a few points to expose the logical problems of this idea. To begin, if we are basing something as vague as our identity upon whether or not it is resembling the actions we have taken in the past within the world, then we have serious issues if the person who’s personal identity is in question has purposely painted the world a false picture of a behavior that he wanted the world to believe was his identity. Do we then split our idea of this person’s identity into two parts: 1) being the inner personality that is true and 2) being the expression of this personality as the world understands it? Which one of these is the real personality?
One that might not comprehend the implications of this might proceed to claim that both are real, in some manner of speaking. However, basic logic tells us that we cannot have P and ~P (something cannot be and also, not be). An example would be to place this person on trial and see which personality is used as the essential personality of the person; the one unknown to the world or the false image that has been created for the world to believe in. The answer is obvious—the only measure available is the latter. This is why physical evidence and testimony is so crucial to the law and also, why the law is so vulnerable to criminal activity within its own ranks.
Another issue I have against the continuity criterion is apparent when memory is somehow utilized as a measure of truth. To give you a science fiction type scenario to help elucidate my meaning, I will say that: pretend humanity has found a way to transfer data from the human brain (our sea of neurons and electron exchange has somehow been proven to be one in the same with memory—not a position I personally take) into small, crystalline structures that resemble computer chips. Now, let’s pretend that these small computer chips can be transported into artificial humanoid robots that resemble real people. If this data transfer can in fact replicate memories and even the neural connectivity of an individual’s brain, down to a particular thought process pattern, would we then say that this artificially intelligent machine is the same person as the one from the memories encoded upon the data chip? I would think not.
It should be pretty obvious that it cannot be the same individual as the one from the memory, of this, we are absolutely certain, yet, I can still see a plausible denial being placed upon this by Locke stating, “Yes, this is true, yet, it might be possible that this machine truly has had person X’s personality transferred into it and thus, it is person X.” This implies that we are not truly our bodies but some non-physical mental entity that can be understood through our actions and behavior within the world. This attempt at saving a Lockean argument also contradicts his earlier point that, even if you don’t remember doing “X” crime, the world can point to you and prove that your body was there and thus, you are responsible. Locke then, somehow intertwines the body with the personality, at least when holding one accountable in the court of law, but then, to save his argument from my attack, would have to also deny this fact.
Even if I were to allow him the benefit of the doubt and let him change his mind about letting the vague memories of strangers count as evidence against a person or even that physical evidence might exist to verify a person’s involvement, I could then ask Locke, “If this machine is identical in personal identity to the original in the continuity criterion, can we not simply hold the machine accountable for the crimes of the original—after all, they both share the same memories, the same personality and, if we design the machine appropriately, even look identical?”
An argumentative person would then try to appeal to the nature of the person versus the machine and claim that, because we know only a flesh and bone person was responsible, we might be able to allow the machine freedom from the crimes of the original. Fine, but what if I would have claimed that it is no longer a machine, but an identical clone, fully equipped with the same memories and indistinguishable from the original (which we no longer know which one is the original and which a clone); how do you wiggle your way out now?
This is the problem of basing personal identity on something as vague and problematic as memory. In fact, I hadn’t even got into the potential problem of implanting memories into the conscious mind of individuals and how the Lockean theory breaks down even more from this action. To save you the time and trouble of going through the motions on this problem, let’s just say the end resembles the same end of a clone having the same memories as the original and being indistinguishable as to who is to be held accountable. Only, with implanted memories, we don’t need to go as far to create the outcome we desire. We can implant memories in the person we wish to frame as well as our false witnesses and even the investigators that plant false evidence at the scene of the “crime.”
Continuity is nothing more than an argument from analogy and cannot serve as something of a keystone that builds the essence of a person. At most, it may demonstrate an apparent relation between the individual’s hidden thoughts and their chosen expression at that moment in time within the world. If one appears to be confined to a set of similar expressions, I would wager that it is not based upon necessity, but upon contingency of their individual hermeneutic understanding of the given situations. Meaning, they act in a similar way because their ability to solve a similar problem is limited to a finite number of solutions at that moment in time and when, or if, they learn to increase these mediums of potential, they might chose to act differently—but this does not make them a different person.
On the contrary, this makes them an ever evolving person with an identity that is not determined by the functions of the mind but through something much greater, something without measure. As this paper is not a paper of my personal beliefs, I will not waste time giving my own philosophy as to the nature of this identity. To remain on Locke, I would say that he was looking for something practical that is understandable within a rigid setting, like the court of law; and to this, I feel he presented well. But if, as a fellow philosopher, I am to judge his ability to elucidate upon the truth of the matter, I would say that he failed to find what he was looking for—as the reasons above illustrate.
For the average person, I believe that this theory would suffice, for people fear more than anything, the chaos of the unknown. It might just be “easier” and more “comforting” to believe that one can measure a person’s identity in the continuity of their past, this relieves some anxiety within the stranger’s mind. If they think a person can truly be known, they no longer have a fear of what lurks behind the veil of the unknown. And, to add comfort to Locke’s theory, most people do acquiesce to a pattern of self-expression for they know, either consciously or unconsciously, that the world punishes those who do not remain consistent. They refrain from violating this “pseudo-maxim” in fear that they might violate parts of some unspoken social contract. For this reason, and this reason alone, I would applaud Locke and his theory; but the applause have nothing to do with truth; I simply think he is a genius in his ability to satisfy an unsaid longing within the social mind as to the nature of the personal identity.
Copyright (C) Arcane Ravenwolf
